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Abstract
The article examines the six-volume autobiographical novel cycle My Struggle by the contemporary Norwegian author Karl Ove 
Knausgaard as a case of parrhe¯sia, that is, telling the truth about oneself. The novel poses writing as a problem, in terms of truth. 
By exploring through My Struggle the preconditions, consequences, and difficulty of speaking the truth and how the practice may 
contravene social norms, the paper tries to get at the role that secrecy and truthfulness play in and for social relationships. In exposing 
his innermost thoughts, feelings, and desires and revealing family secrets for everyone to see and read about them, Knausgaard 
exceeded rules that govern sociality and felt obliged to be inconsiderate to others, on whom the parrhesiast practice nevertheless 
always depends. Ultimately, the novel is a freedom experiment that fails, transcending the boundary between art and life, literature 
and the social.
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Confesiones de un parresiastés atormentado
La escritura como fórmula para contar la verdad sobre uno mismo en Mi lucha  
de Karl Ove Knausgaard
Resumen
El artículo examina Mi lucha, el ciclo de seis novelas autobiográficas del autor noruego contemporáneo Karl Ove Knausgaard como 
un caso de parresia, es decir, de contar la verdad sobre uno mismo. La novela plantea la escritura como un problema respecto a la 
verdad. Al explorar en Mi lucha las precondiciones, consecuencias y la dificultad de contar la verdad y cómo esta práctica puede 
contravenir las normas sociales, el artículo intenta ver qué papel tienen el secretismo y la sinceridad en las relaciones sociales. Al 
exponer sus pensamientos, sentimientos y deseos más íntimos, y poner al descubierto secretos familiares para que todo el mundo los 
pueda ver y leer, Knausgaard sobrepasó las reglas que reinan la sociabilidad y se sintió obligado a ser desconsiderado con los otros, 
sobre los cuales, sin embargo, siempre depende la práctica del parresiastés. Finalmente, la novela es un experimento de libertad que 
fracasa y que trasciende la frontera entre el arte y la vida, la literatura y lo social.
Palabras clave
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Introduction
In the essay “The Depreciated Legacy of Cervantes”, Milan 
Kundera considers the history of the European novel as a “sequence 
of discoveries”. According to Kundera, the novel, during the four 
centuries of its European reincarnation, has disclosed, displayed, 
and illuminated great existential themes:
In its own way, through its own logic, the novel discovered 
the various dimensions of existence one by one: with 
Cervantes and his contemporaries, it inquires into the nature 
of adventure; with Richardson, it begins to examine “what 
happens inside,” to unmask the secret life of the feelings; with 
Balzac, it discovers man’s rootedness in history; with Flaubert, 
it explores the terra previously incognita of the everyday; with 
Tolstoy, it focuses on the intrusion of the irrational in human 
behavior and decisions. It probes time: the elusive past with 
Proust, the elusive present with Joyce. With Thomas Mann, 
it examines the role of the myths from the remote past that 
control our present actions. (Kundera, 1988, p. 5)
As a more recent case, the celebrated and monumental My Struggle 
(Nor. Min Kamp; 2009–2011), an autobiographic and introspective 
novel spanning six volumes by the contemporary Norwegian 
author Karl Ove Knausgaard (b. 1968), explores all these crucial 
existential themes. With one exception, though: it knows almost 
nothing of adventure – apart from the adventure of language, 
perhaps. In fact, the absence of adventure and thrill is what largely 
 1.  I intend the notion of  “monument” here not as something preserving and commemorating the past but rather, following Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(1994, pp. 167–8), as  “a bloc of sensations that owe their preservation only to themselves and that provide the event with the compound that celebrates 
it. The monument’s action is not memory but fabulation”.
defines the contents of My Struggle. Not much happens in it. On 
the surface, the book is about Knausgaard’s observations, taken 
from life. It is about his life as he has lived it, from early childhood 
to the present, with the sixth and final volume already reflecting 
on the controversial reception of the published two first volumes. 
My Struggle even stands as a kind of monument to the banality 
of the mundane.1 Weeks pass by just like the preceding ones and 
the author’s namesake protagonist Karl Ove Knausgaard wakes up 
at dawn to write, smokes cigarettes and drinks coffee throughout 
the day (both to the extreme), walks his children to the nursery, 
washes laundry, checks emails, collects his children and spends 
afternoons with them in a park, shops for groceries, cooks dinner, 
reads to the children, puts them to bed, works a bit in the evenings, 
and the next morning pretty much the same routine is repeated. 
Due to the uneventfulness, at times the novel can be an 
exhausting read, indeed amounting to a tiring struggle even 
for the reader, who is not spared the least detail. My Struggle 
contains vast amounts of the kind of text usually omitted from 
books before publication at the editing stage (the sixth volume, 
for example, contains an over 400 pages long essay on Hitler 
and national socialism). Knausgaard tries to include every event, 
fact, memory, conversation, and perception, put everything in. 
The writing’s extraordinary close attention to details has enraged 
some critics. For example, in Nation, William Deresiewicz (2014) 
complained in utter frustration: “Who cares? I kept wondering. 
Why is he telling me this? Who is he to think his life is worth this 
kind of treatment? I wasn’t just bored (even his fans are bored), I 
was angry about being bored. I felt my time was being wasted”.
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What is the point of it all? Why is Knausgaard making us read 
about his life in such overwhelming detail? Why does he think 
his life is worth treating for 3,600 pages? The literary motifs, 
however, are quite clear. It is not because Knausgaard would 
think that his life is particularly interesting or exceptional that he 
writes about it; on the contrary, he confesses how he feels that he 
lacks inner greatness. The main character Karl Ove Knausgaard is 
secondary. My Struggle is not some overlong ego trip, a case of 
narcissistic exhibitionism. The narrator portrays the protagonist, 
himself, as mediocre. He is just like anyone else, an everyman, 
das Man, a notion with which philosopher Martin Heidegger 
(1962) characterized the tyranny of the everyday existence of 
Dasein. What matters is what is told through the character’s life. 
My Struggle explores the inner life of the subject, rooted in the 
dense topography of everyday life and fleeting time. Life is a 
struggle; it is about being in the middle, in emotional turmoil, 
complex relationships, hardship, boredom, and crises, without 
pause. Knausgaard saturates the landscape of the mundane by 
making its minutest details transparent. Thereby it is infused by 
beauty and meaning, and, paradoxically, every significant detail 
attains almost a gigantic dimension. “Meaningful, meaningless, 
meaningful, meaningless, this is the wave that washes through 
our lives and creates its inherent tension”, Knausgaard suggests 
in volume 3, Boyhood Island (2014, p. 9; hereafter I refer to the 
individual volumes of the novel by their Roman number, I–VI). The 
same ebb and flow of tides characterizes the entire My Struggle 
cycle and creates the inner dynamic of Knausgaard’s writing. In 
its attention to the minutest details of the life of an individual, 
My Struggle may be said to display one of the advantages of art 
over scholarship, as described by Georg Simmel (2004a, pp. 55–6): 
by starting from a narrowly defined problem, Knausgaard’s own 
life (as a struggle), the book carries it to its uttermost limit, and 
thereby extends the unique and the individual to the general and 
the typical. It mediates the relation between the particular and 
the general, turning the personal into something universal, and 
the universal into something personally lived. Indeed, it is largely 
the felt resonance with their own life what has made readers 
fall in love with Knausgaard’s novel: while it is about himself 
that Knausgaard writes, people have felt that they are reading 
about their own life. As author Zadie Smith (2013) describes her 
affectionate relationship to My Struggle in a review: “You live his 
life with him. […] You don’t simply ‘identify’ with the character, 
effectively you ‘become’ them”.
In this article, I examine not so much what My Struggle is 
about or what has made it the literary sensation that it is as how 
 2.  This is roughly how Knausgaard sees writing in his book Inadvertent (2018), where he explains the reasons why he writes and shares his views and expe-
riences of the creative process. 
 3.  To some extent, however, Knausgaard’s prose is sociologically informed. In My Struggle, he, for example, mentions in passing sociologial ideas here and 
there and such authors as Marx, Arendt, Serres, Derrida, Foucault, Levinas, Agamben, and Latour (untypical of novels, the final volume of the cycle, titled 
The End, even contains a bibliography). 
Knausgaard says what he has to say. The focus on the mode 
or form of writing to a certain extent aligns my approach with 
how philosopher and literary critic Georg Lukács saw the task 
of the sociology of literature. Lukács emphasized that instead 
of content it should study form, since he thought that “form is 
what is truly social in literature” (Lukács, 1972, p. 71). However, 
my reading of Knausgaard’s novel differs from the mainstream of 
the sociology of literature in that instead of treating My Struggle 
as an object of study, I rather think with it. Philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze regarded art as a creative enterprise of thought, insisting 
artists to be also thinkers (Deleuze, 2004; Deleuze and Guattari, 
1994; Smith, 2004, pp. viii–ix). This does not mean that painters, 
musicians, filmmakers, or writers would necessarily think about 
what they are doing, that writing would come down to spelling 
out preconceived thoughts, nor that thinking would be reducible 
to intentional action. On the contrary, it may very well be that 
when one paints, makes music, writes, and so on one does not 
think, at least not if thinking is understood as an action that is 
separate from the creative endeavour itself. The notion of art as 
an enterprise of thought only means that painters think in terms 
of lines and colours, musicians in terms of sounds, filmmakers in 
terms of images, and writers in terms of words. And it means that 
thought happens, inadvertently, as it were.2 Knausgaard is without 
doubt no sociologist, and My Struggle has no explicit sociological 
motifs or aspirations,3 but it poses its own set of problems instead, 
using materials and techniques peculiar to literature. Nevertheless, 
Knausgaard’s prose does resonate with key sociological themes 
and can be used to enrich sociological concepts and social theory, 
and that is what I attempt in this text.
The back cover of volume 1, A Death in the Family, states 
that Knaugaard writes with “exhilarating honesty”. It is true 
that he endeavours to write about his life and its (non-)events 
as truthfully as possible, without holding back anything. He 
lays bare his inner life, exposing his innermost secret thoughts, 
impulses, desires, feelings, and insecurities, while also revealing 
family secrets and things about his close ones they would probably 
rather have preferred to keep to themselves. The use of extremely 
personal material not only sparked a debate over the use of facts, 
real situations, and real names of people in fiction around the 
time of the publication of My Struggle, but the author was also 
threatened with legal action by some of his relatives. All this 
makes the question of truth and truthfulness highly significant. 
In what follows, I take up the issue of truthfulness by exploring 
Knausgaard’s writing in and of My Struggle as a form of truth-
telling about oneself. In the lecture course The Courage of the 
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Truth (The Government of Self and Others II) (2011), delivered in 
1984 at the Collège de France, philosopher and historian Michel 
Foucault examined the role and importance of parrhe¯sia, free-
spokenness, in Greek and Roman culture. According to Foucault 
(2011), the notion of parrhe¯sia is a constitutive component of 
truth-telling about self in ancient morality: one should always 
tell the truth about oneself. I examine not only how the practice 
of parrhe¯sia manifests in My Struggle or, more exactly, how the 
novel functions within the dimension of parrhe¯sia, but also the 
preconditions and consequences of truth-telling. While telling the 
truth is an important moral imperative, it is not without friction 
compatible with sociality and its norms. Ultimately, by reading 
Knausgaard’s My Struggle, my aim is to get at the role of truth and 
secrecy in and for social relationships. Truthfulness and secrecy, as 
Simmel has reminded, are “of the most far-reaching significance 
for relations among men [sic]” (Simmel, 1950, p. 312). While 
we are encouraged and even obliged to tell the truth, out of 
consideration, politeness, and shame we may also withhold and 
hide some matters, as concealment has positive effects for the 
maintenance of social relationships. 
Before exploring Knausgaard’s writing as a parrhesiast practice, 
I begin by asking in what way can My Struggle, as a piece of 
literature, have a relation to truth in the first place. To what extent 
may a novel be expected – or is even able – to tell the truth, or 
does it lie completely beyond the entire question of true and false? 
After that, I discuss Knausgaard’s prose in My Struggle as a mode 
of truth-telling. He is committed to getting to the truth of the 
story, to writing something that is not simply made up. I examine 
the characteristics of parrhesiast writing, together with the risks 
and the paradox of responsibility involved. Then I examine the 
preconditions of parrhe¯sia. In order to tell the truth one needs 
to get rid of shame and not think about the consequences of 
one’s words. In this regard, My Struggle is ultimately a freedom 
experiment that fails, but this does not diminish its value. I conclude 
by summing up how the novel poses writing as a question, in terms 
of truth, and how it transcends the boundary between art and 
life, literature and the social.
Autofiction: memory as an art  
of invention
According to a famous statement by Austrian writer Hermann 
Broch, “the sole raison d’être of the novel is to discover what only 
the novel can discover” (quoted in Kundera, 1988, pp. 5, 36). 
Broch’s assertion manifests a modernistic idea, according to which 
artforms differ as to their final purpose, and the justification and 
value of each is dependent on how well it corresponds to its 
nature and thus fulfills its potential. The task of the novel is to see 
what has not been seen before and say what has not been said. 
It is able to do so insofar as it sets its own particular problems, 
uses its own materials and techniques, and has a logic of its own. 
The kind of requirement of truthfulness applicable to scientific 
research, for example, does not apply to the novel. Instead of 
being measured by facts and reality, the novel uses imagination 
as its driving force. The novel should not therefore be judged by 
how reliably and accurately it gets the facts right or whether it 
depicts reality as it is or distorts it. It fabricates, fabulates, makes 
up, and invents new realities or discovers hitherto unknown 
modes and segments of existence. Rather than lacking reality, 
it is in a sense more-than-real: it is not its lack of reality but its 
excess that ultimately enables the novel to achieve what it alone 
may achieve.
For Kundera, the novel is able to uncover existential themes in 
a manner that is different from how philosophy examines them. 
According to him, here lies the entire not only literary but also 
moral value of the novel (Kundera, 1988, pp. 5–6). My Struggle 
responds to this call. Yet it is a very particular kind of novel. 
In it, Knausgaard explicitly announces his aversion for all things 
fictional and his equal commitment to writing anti-fiction. In A 
Man in Love, which comprises the second volume of My Struggle, 
Knausgaard tells how he had become fed up with fiction and 
stories over the years. He suggests that we live in a world saturated 
with fiction: fiction is not only something which surrounds us but 
through which we come to see the world. As he writes:
Over recent years I had increasingly lost faith in literature. I 
read and thought this is something someone has made up. 
Perhaps it was because we were totally inundated with fiction 
and stories. It had got out of hand. Wherever you turned 
you saw fiction. All these millions of paperbacks, hardbacks, 
DVDs and TV series, they were all about made-up people in 
a made-up, though realistic, world. And news in the press, TV 
news and radio news had exactly the same format, they were 
also stories, and it made no difference whether what they told 
had actually happened or not. It was a crisis, I felt in every fibre 
of my body, something saturating was spreading through my 
consciousness like lard, not least because the nucleus of this 
fiction, whether true or not, was verisimilitude and the distance 
it held to reality was the same. (II, pp. 496–7)
The idea of a pervasive culture of fiction resonates with sociologist 
Jean Baudrillard’s (1983) suggestion of the dissolution of the 
boundary between the real and the imaginary. According to 
Baudrillard, we do not live in reality but in “hyperreality”, where 
everything has become simulation, thus making the sign more 
real than the reality it represents. In the age of “simulacrum”, 
the feeling of the world disappearing into images and stories 
also easily results in disjointedness from the world and from our 
responsibility to others. For example, in the sixth volume of My 
Struggle Knausgaard writes that for Anders Breivik, who killed 77 
Norwegians on Utoya island in 2011, the victims were not real 
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people, as it were. It is like his acts did not have real consequences 
for him, as in a computer game, for example. Instead of feeling 
obliged by the face of the others, the people he murdered were 
just images and pixels. He was completely blasé. 
Countering the culture of fiction, Knausgaard aspires to write 
something true and meaningful, something that is not simply 
made up. In a sense, then, My Struggle is a work of anti-fiction. It 
is a novel that sets out to dethrone and discard all novels, a book 
that tries to finish off literature. It is driven by the will to truth. It 
is a work of total writing, determined to tell everything about the 
author’s life, without leaving anything out. In a sense, it is a book 
of existences, capturing and immortalizing Knausgaard’s life and 
the lives of those close to him. It thereby also struggles against 
the finitude of our fleeting and flickering existence; Knausgaard’s 
writing is through and through accompanied by the commanding 
presence of unavoidable and immanent death.
One of Knausgaard’s main preoccupations in My Struggle 
is with memory, as memories make up our personal narrative 
and form a significant part of our identity. It is largely thanks to 
memory that our past continues to exist in the present and we 
come to obtain an inner biography and a meaningful personal 
identity. Were one unable to remember past events or form 
new memories, one would be condemned to live one’s life in a 
perpertual present. Knausgaard’s writing brings up and calls forth 
memories, which he then sinks into the text. “Writing is drawing 
the essence of what we know out of the shadows. That is what 
writing is about”, he suggests (I, pp. 212–3). In the first volume, A 
Death in the Family, Knausgaard tells us about a childhood event 
of him watching TV at home, alone. While the news is reporting 
about a fishing smack sunk off the coast of Northern Norway with 
its crew drown, he suddenly sees the outline of a face emerging 
on the surface of the sea. He rushes outside to tell his father. 
This particular memory image is not so much pursued as just 
happens, in a flash. Knausgaard is thrown into his memories. He 
suddenly sees his childhood livingroom, the teak television cabinet, 
snowflakes outside the window, the sea on the television screen, 
and the face that appeared in it. And, along with these particular 
images is actualized a whole level or region of the past to which 
they belong: the 1970s, the time when he was eight and his father 
thirty-two, the atmosphere from that time, the housing estate 
neighbourhood, and family life. In Knausgaard’s prose, an entire 
landscape of the past is remarkably evoked along with a particular 
recollection (My Struggle is clearly influenced by Proust’s A la 
recherché du temps perdu, and Knausgaard also mentions in the 
novel how he had been fervently reading Proust’s work). Writing 
is thus a crucial act of reminiscence: when the author writes about 
particular memories, a vast restore of other detailed memories 
and an entire world of perceptions and inner feelings begins to 
 4.  This has parallels with Henri Bergson’s theory of memory; see Deleuze (1991). 
unfold (cf. Krell, 1990, p. xi). It is also typical of My Struggle that 
the events are not narrated strictly chronologically, following a 
linear sequential order, but the text is full of chronological shifts 
from past to present and back, and so the past (virtually) coexists 
with the present.4 
Staying true to his ethos of truthfulness, in volume 3, Boyhood 
Island, Knausgaard likens his memory to a perfect pitch. He writes 
about how the things of his childhood have sunk in his memory: 
“Little did I know then that every detail of this landscape, and every 
person living in it, would forever be lodged in my memory as true 
as perfect pitch” (III, p. 490). However, it is equally noteworthy 
how throughout My Struggle Knausgaard also constantly questions 
the accuracy and reliability of his memory, makes fun of his poor 
memory, ironically likening it to a physical disability. As truthfully 
as events and experiences may (or may not) sink in the memory, 
recalling and actualizing them as recollection-images changes or 
to some extent even reinvents them. For example, early on in 
Boyhood Island, Knausgaard acknowledges how “[m]emory is not 
a reliable quantity in life” (III, p. 10). This is so because “memory 
doesn’t prioritize the truth. It is never the demand for truth that 
determines whether memory recalls an action accurately or not. 
It is self-interest which does. Memory is pragmatic, it is sly and 
artful, […] it does everything it can to keep its host satisfied” (III, 
p. 10). Knausgaard clearly writes for example about the traumatic 
childhood relationship with his father to set himself free; writing 
serves a therapeutic end of liberating himself and is for him a way 
of recuperating from the past, whose weight would have become 
unbearable had his memories remained locked away. The matters 
need to be stated aloud to cope with them and to prevent them 
from falling into oblivion. 
The reference Knausgaard makes to his poor memory not 
only hints at the disparity between involuntary and voluntary 
memory – that is, the memories he is fed and those that he pursues 
by will and is able to remember – but one can also take it as a 
reminder to the reader that My Struggle is not a tour de force of 
perfect pitch reminiscence, but a piece of literature. Knausgaard 
is definitely no savant with hypermnesia. He is an author writing 
eminent fictions. As a practice of reminiscence, writing enacts 
and produces realities. While memory may preserve, reminiscence 
does not merely repeat and uncover the past as it really is, but 
partly reinvents it. “[T]he art of memory is not an art of recitation 
but an art of invention”, as Gunnar Olsson (2007, p. 115) aptly 
puts it.  Writing about the past is thereby not so much about 
rediscovering what already exists as giving being to what did not 
exist, thereby blurring the boundaries between reality, memory, 
and imagination. In an interview with The Guardian, Knausgaard 
himself has explicitly acknowledged the mixture of memory and 
creativity in writing My Struggle: 
Confessions of a Troubled Parrhesiasthttp://digithum.uoc.edu
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Universidad de Antioquia
Digithum, No. 24 (July 2019) | ISSN 1575-2275  A scientific e-journal coedited by UOC and UdeA
53
Olli Pyyhtinen, 2019
FUOC, 2019
A RELATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CULTURE  
AND SOCIETY
For me, […] there has been no difference in remembering 
something and creating something. When I wrote my fictional 
novels they always had a starting point of something real. Those 
images that are not real are exactly the same strength and 
power of the real ones and the line between them is completely 
blurred. When I write something, I can’t remember in the end 
if this is a memory or if it’s not – I’m talking about fiction. So 
for me it is the same thing. It was like I was writing a straight 
novel when I was writing this but the rule was it had to be true. 
Not true in an objective sense but in the way I remember it. 
There’s a lot of false memory in the book but it’s there because 
it’s the way it is, it’s real. (The Guardian, 1 March 2015)
It is therefore more apt to call My Struggle a work of autofiction 
than anti-fiction.5 The term “autofiction” is employed in literary 
criticism to refer to a form of fictionalized autobiography. It 
appeared the first time in the novel Fils by Serge Doubrovsky, 
published in 1977. On the back cover, the book is defined as 
“fiction of strictly real events or facts, if we want, autofiction”. 
My Struggle, too, is part autobiography and part fiction. Its author 
makes a pact with himself and with his reader not to lie and to 
recite events as he remembers them. The author, narrator, and 
main character seem identical. Knausgaard uses his real name and 
describes real life events, and while doing that he may modify 
certain facts, but he does so in search for truth, especially the 
truth about self (see also Tuck, 2015). Modifying some things 
is more or less unavoidable, also insofar as the prerequisite for 
literature being meaningful to others, too, and speaking to them 
and not only to the author him- or herself is that the writing is to 
some extent distanced from the person of the author. Knausgaard 
expresses this by noting that “literature must be personal but 
not private”; when the writing is private “it is of relevance only 
to the person writing” (Summer, p. 126).6 The literary truth is 
thus of a particular kind: “the writer has to compromise his or 
her personal truth, that is to create an ‘I’ with which he or she 
doesn’t fully identify, in order to express something that may be 
true for others” (Summer, p. 126). The novel thereby also hides 
while it reveals and discloses. My Struggle, obviously, is not an 
immediate presentation of Knausgaard’s life and its inner reality, 
but the writing transforms and translates life into the form of 
literature by narrating, stylizing, selecting, reducing, arranging, 
and recomposing. The “sole law” of literature for Knausgaard is: 
“everything has to submit to form” (I, pp. 217–8). Autofiction 
needs to constantly balance between being true to art and being 
true to life. Importantly, this also suggests that the truthfulness 
of the recollection-images is inseperably tied to the practice of 
 5.  Stefana Popa (2017) has examined how My Struggle could be framed by using the categories of autobiography, autofiction, and performative biography.
 6.  In the article, I refer to other books by Knausgaard by their individual titles. 
 7.  As uneasy as I am with the use of the gendered masculine peronal pronoun, I will nevertheless use it here, since in Antiquity the subjects of truth-telling as 
discussed by Foucault were male.  
writing, which actualizes, produces, and enacts them. The text is 
an artifice of authenticity, giving the impression of true confession. 
Instead of being just a question of the accuracy of memory, it is 
dependent on practices: the memories come into being along with 
the practice of writing. 
Parrhe¯sia
In his final lecture course at the Collège de France that he gave 
in Spring 1984, only a few months before his death, Michel 
Foucault examined a particular set of practices called parrhe¯sia 
in ancient culture. The practices involve telling the truth about 
oneself. According to Foucault, although parrhe¯sia also has 
some technical aspects, unlike rhetoric, for example, it is not a 
technique concerning the way things are said. Whereas rhetoric 
amounts to an art in which the person who speaks need not at 
all believe in what he or she says, parrhe¯sia, on the contrary, 
entails a strong bond between the person speaking and what he 
or she says. While the rhetorician may thus also very well be an 
effective liar, the parrhesiast is “the courageous teller of truth”. 
Accordingly, Foucault stresses that parrhe¯sia is not a skill or art 
but a “modality of truth-telling”, “a way of being which is akin to 
virtue”(Foucault, 2011, p. 14). And, as such, it can be contrasted 
with other basic modes of truth-telling found in Antiquity and, 
in varying forms, also in contemporary society. Looking at the 
contrasts between parrhe¯sia and them also enables us to better 
get at the characteristics of Knausgaard’s writing as a way of 
achieving and expressing the truth.
Firstly, parrhe¯sia is to be distinguished from prophetic truth-
telling. While the prophet does not speak for himself, but in the 
name of someone else and with a voice that is not his own, 
the parrhesiast speaks in his own name and expresses thoughts, 
convictions, and opinions that are his own.7 Nor does the 
parrhesiast foretell the truth, but unveils what is. In addition, what 
also distinguishes the parrhesiast from the prophet is that he does 
not speak in riddles, but says the things that he says “as clearly 
as possible, without any disguise or rhetorical embellishment”. 
(Foucault, 2011, pp. 15–6) This applies to Knausgaard, too. He 
signs the memories, thoughts, and experiences he shares, and 
aspires to “describe reality as it is” (VI, p. 1010) As he describes the 
process of writing My Struggle in a small book titled Inadvertent: 
“I wanted to get close to reality […] I would write only about the 
things that had actually happened, and I would write about them 
as I remembered them” (Inadvetent, p. 37).
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Secondly, parrhe¯sia needs to be contrasted with the truth-
telling of wisdom. What the sage and the parrhesiast have in 
common is that both are present in their truth-telling. Unlike the 
prophet, they speak in their own name. However, while the sage 
does not need to speak, but may keep his wisdom to himself, as 
if in a state of withdrawal, the parrhesiast is obliged to speak. 
Knausgaard feels obliged from within. It is his duty and responsibility 
to write about the things he writes. What sets Knausgaard 
apart from the aforementioned das Man is his determination to 
write. His writing is the only thing that really matters to him: 
I wanted to write, that was all I wanted, and I couldn’t 
understand those who didn’t, how they could be happy with 
an ordinary job, whatever it was, whether teacher, camera 
operator, bureaucrat, academic, farmer, TV host, journalist, 
designer, promoter, fisherman, lorry driver, gardener, nurse or 
astronomer. How could that be enough? (II, p. 435) 
Without writing, anything would just become meaningless for the 
narrator and main character of My Struggle. Accordingly, while 
displaying other struggles as well – against his father, an alcoholic 
who still had a grip of him even in Knausgaard’s adulthood; against 
his childhood shyness and teenage angst; against his heart which 
belonged to another woman while he was still married – the novel 
is essentially about the constant struggle to find time, peace, 
and quiet for writing as a father caring for a young family. In 
addition, whereas the sage, like the prophet, speaks in riddles, 
the parrhesiast speaks as clearly as possible. Knausgaard’s prose 
is lucid and readable. Finally, while the truth-telling of the sage 
concerns the very being and nature of things and the world, that 
of the parrhesiast has to do with individuals and situations to 
reveal their truth to them (Foucault, 2011, pp. 16–9). And this 
also captures the contents of My Struggle. It depicts Knausgaard’s 
family, relatives, friends, and acquintances in a way that they 
may not like but may in fact be offended and hurt by. But, above 
all, the cycle is about Knausgaard himself and his relation to self 
and others.  
Thirdly, and finally, parrhe¯sia can be contrasted with the truth-
telling of the one who teaches. Like the parrhesiast and unlike 
the sage, the teacher has a duty to speak: “He is obliged, in a 
way, to tell the knowledge he possesses and the truth he knows, 
because this knowledge and truth are linked to a whole weight of 
tradition” (Foucault, 2011, p. 24). However, what distinguishes 
the teacher from the parrhesiast is that the former does not take 
any risk in telling the truth that he has received and must pass on. 
One does not need courage to teach. In speaking the truth, the 
parrhesiast, by contrast, takes a risk. Not only does he place at risk 
the relationship he has with the person to whom he speaks, but he 
also risks his own position. As Foucault puts it, the “teacher’s truth-
telling brings together and binds; the parrhesiast’s truth-telling 
risks hostility, war, hatred, and death” (Foucault, 2011, p. 25).
With the courage of a parrhesiast, Knausgaard tries to write 
of his life as truthfully as possible. In Some Rain Must Fall, which 
comprises book 5 of My Struggle, he mentions how he had wanted 
to write about the death of his father and the impact he had made 
on him, but “had spent ten years without achieving anything” 
until he eschewed stories and started to write about his own life 
truthfully, in a diary-like manner. Then, “all of a sudden, out of 
nowhere, it was just flowing”: “It was like having a head rush or 
walking in your sleep, a state in which you are out of yourself, 
and what was curious about this particular experience was that it 
continued unabated” (V, p. 609). His aim “was to get as close as 
possible to my life” (II, p. 515), so he writes about his childhood 
and teenage years; about his relationship to his brother; about the 
music he had listened to obsessively as a teenager, about books 
that he has read, and about paintings he feels passionate about; 
about getting drunk with friends as a young man; about his wife 
and children; and about the routine flow of time which makes 
everything so predictable and safe. But above all, he writes about 
his relationship to his life and about his sorrowful feeling of being a 
stranger or outsider in his own life: “A life is simple to understand, 
the elements that determine it are few. In mine there were two. My 
father and the fact that I had never belonged anywhere” (II, p. 494). 
Knausgaard writes fiction based on truth; all the names and 
events in My Struggle are authentic but – as already suggested – 
they are subjugated to the form of the novel and to literary tropes. 
Knausgaard felt that, to be able to write about his life truthfully, it 
was important to just go ahead, without holding back anything. 
He wished to get as close as possible to things. He tells it all, even 
the most painful memories and despicable things he has done. He 
is determined and committed to tell the truth without concealment 
and reserve. In speaking the truth, he wishes to explore his life 
as it really is. In My Struggle, writing of one’s life as truthfully as 
possible, without hiding any part of it, appears as a practice of 
self, as a way of investigating one’s relation to others, oneself, 
and truth. And it is telling that it was also mainly Knausgaard’s 
sincerity and truthfulness that was questioned when My Struggle 
was placed under criticism and in dispute. His depiction of the 
death of his father in the first volume was fiercely contested by 
some of his relatives. Consequently, he even began to doubt 
himself and his own version of the events: Is the recollection of 
his father having lived the last years of his life with his mother 
and having died surrounded by bottles of alcohol only a false 
memory? Did Knausgaard exaggerate things? And, worse, did he 
even exploit his father’s death for his own benefit, for the sake 
of a juicy story with shocking details? Was he trying to gather 
sympathy for himself? For he admits that on some occasions he 
had talked to people about his father to make himself seem more 
interesting in their eyes (VI; The Guardian, 1 March 2015). What 
is at stake here is thus, above all, Knausgaard’s truth-telling.
The conflict with relatives shows well how in telling the truth, 
the parrhesiast takes a risk. As Foucault puts it, “[f]or there to be 
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parrhe¯sia, in speaking the truth one must open up, establish, and 
confront the risk of offending the other person, of irritating him, 
of making him angry and provoking him” (Foucault, 2011, p. 11). 
What distinguishes My Struggle from a diary, for example, is that 
whereas the latter is private, not meant to be seen and read by 
others, the former is public. It is not intended to be hidden from 
the eyes of others and remain in secrecy, but it is written for others, 
to be published and with the intention that people would read it. 
Parrhesiast practices always require an other, who “must accept 
the game of parrhe¯sia by listening to the person telling them the 
truth” (Foucault, 2011, p. 12).
In The Courage of the Truth, Foucault depicts how the category 
of the other presupposed by parrhe¯sia comprises a spectrum of 
different figures. While in ancient culture s/he could be anyone, 
in the modern psy-culture the other person involved in the game 
of parrhe¯sia is usually the doctor, psychiatrist, psychologist, 
psychotherapist, or the psychoanalyst. The other assumed 
by My Struggle, is, of course, the reader. The readers of My 
Struggle can be dividied into two: on the one hand, there are the 
unindividuated, anonymous others of the larger readership and, 
on the other, all those – one way or another close to Knausgaard 
– who are mentioned in the six volumes (and to whom the author 
also gave the opportunity to read what he had written about them 
before publishing it). It is particularly the relationship with these 
individuated others, from family members to relatives, ex-wife, 
and friends, that Knausgaard’s writing undermines. However much 
the other person is indispensable for the subject to be able to tell 
the truth about oneself, parrhe¯sia also simultaneously puts the 
relationship to the other at risk. But parrhe¯sia may not only break 
or end the personal and friendly relationship with the other to 
whom one speaks, but the parrhesiast may also place oneself at 
risk. The legal case threatened Knausgaard’s reputation; he might 
have lost face and credibility as an author. It might have become 
impossible for him to continue practicing his profession. He might 
even have been seen as ridiculous, as a public joke. But there was 
also a financial risk involved, as he might have been made to pay 
amendments. 
Because of the immanent risk involved, telling the truth thus 
requires courage. It would be easier and safer to just remain silent. 
In speaking the truth one is also faced with ethical dilemmas. The 
parrhesiast is therefore a troubled figure. Does my obligation to 
tell the truth override my responsibility to those close to me? May 
I allow myself or am I even obliged to tell the truth while knowing 
that it will hurt others; should I speak my heart out regardless of 
the feelings and integrity of others? Whilst being a part of morality, 
parrhe¯sia may hence also come out as immoral and irresponsible, 
colliding responsibilities that are incompatible with each other. The 
notion of responsibility is ultimately condemned to a paradox, as 
Jacques Derrida (1995, p. 68) has observed: I cannot respond 
to the other and fulfil my duty without at the same time risking 
betraying others to whom, too, I am bound by responsibility. By 
responding to the obligation as an author to himself, to his past, 
and to his readers to tell the truth, Knausgaard, in the same instant, 
betrays those close to him. 
The face: on shame, secrecy,  
and sociality
The “father of sociology”, Auguste Comte, has been told to have 
had a mirror on his desk, in which he, like Narcissus falling in love 
with his own reflection, admired himself and his brilliance after 
each sentence that he wrote. This literary image of the writing 
self, catching one’s reflection, segues into a scene in My Struggle, 
too. It is 27th February 2009, 11:43 p.m. in Malmö, Sweden, and 
Knausgaard, having just written about the childhood event of 
seeing in television the mysterious face on the surface of the sea, 
spots his face reflected on the window glass before him:
As I sit here writing this, I recognize that more than thirty years 
have passed. In the window before me I can vaguely make 
out the reflection of my face. Apart from one eye, which is 
glistening, and the area immediately beneath, which dimly 
reflects a little light, the whole of the left side is in shadow. Two 
deep furrows divide my forehead, one deep furrow intersects 
each cheek, all of them as if filled with darkness, and with the 
eyes staring serious, and the corners of the mouth drooping, 
it is impossible not to consider this face gloomy. (I, p. 27) 
Here the gaze turned on itself is not so much a case of “the 
looking glass self” – by which Charles Cooley (1902) referred 
to our perception of how we are perceived by others – as a 
manifestation of abysmal strangeness. Whereas Comte, with 
great adoration, discovered in his reflection himself as a sovereign 
subject, Knausgaard inspects the reflection of his face and its 
features as one would observe an external object. While our face 
likens a unique and recognizable landscape, on whose surface our 
life, experiences, and memories leave visible traces in the form 
of blotches, scars, wrinkles, and furrows, it is not his own true 
face that Knausgaard sees reflected in the window, but someone 
else’s, as it were. The face is almost inhuman. There is something 
“stiff and mask-like” in it, and thus Knausgaard finds it “almost 
impossible to associate [it] with myself whenever I happen to 
catch a glimpse of it in a shop window” (I, p. 28). 
The face appears here as the tragic mask. It displays and 
unfolds the dynamic relationship between surface and depth, 
with what is perceptible and what lies hidden behind what we 
see. On the one hand, the face is the mark of our individuality and 
identity. The face reveals who we are, and thus it amounts to what 
is the most naked and exposed in us. It renders visible the invisible 
forces that model the flesh and are manifest in it. To reveal one’s 
face is thereby to reveal oneself, just as to hide one’s face means 
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to hide one’s identity. Emmanuel Levinas (1969, p. 50) suggests 
that “[t]he way the other presents himself, exceeding the idea 
of the other in me, we call the face”. The other, the you, whom I 
encounter face-to-face, is irreducible to the image that I have of 
the person, but exists independently of it. In the famous excurse 
“Wie ist Gesellschaft möglich?” (“How is society possible?”) to 
the opening chapter of Soziologie, Simmel maintains that the you 
whom I face is for oneself a subject exactly the same way as I am 
for myself (Simmel, [1908] 1992, p. 45). 
However, on the other hand, the face is also a mask in itself, 
presenting the front of what remains hidden behind, unseen, 
just as we may wear different faces in the company of different 
people. As is well-known, the Latin word persona originally meant 
the mask worn by theatre actors. The social mask organizes our 
relationship to society and others, as each one of us assume 
various social roles. We also try to present ourselves to others in 
a light that is favourable to ourselves (Goffman, [1959] 1990, p. 
18), and thus engage in impression management by accentuating 
certain matters and concealing others (ibid., p. 74). In book 1, 
A Death in the Family, Knausgaard mentions the existence of a 
stark discrepancy between the front that he shows to others in 
face-to-face relationships and his inner self: “I do not want anyone 
to see me, […] no one gets close and no one sees me” (I, p. 28). 
Knausgaard confesses that he never reveals his true colours, his 
ownmost thoughts and feelings when being in the company of 
others: “I never say what I really think, what I really mean, but 
always more or less agree with whoever I am talking to at the 
time, pretend that what they say is of interest to me” (I, p. 27). 
While in his mirror-image Knausgaard only sees the face of a 
man he finds it almost impossible to associate with, just as in social 
intercourse he gives others only the mask, the surface that he 
wishes them to accept, writing functions as a mirror that enables 
him to confront and see his inner self. Accordingly, My Struggle 
is an attempt to lose the tragic mask and reveal the man behind 
it, without concealment and reserve, without hiding or leaving 
out any part of himself. One still gazes upon oneself from the 
outside, as it were, but tries to accomplish it by making an effort 
to penetrate the surface and dive into one’s self. The truthfulness 
and objectivity of the introspective gaze is tied simultaneously 
both to the inside and to the outside: 
To write about one’s self is in a certain sense the opposite 
of empathy, since empathy moves from the outer towards 
the inner, while writing about oneself means moving from 
the inner towards the outer. And yet both processes aim 
at the same thing, intimate knowledge and, through that, 
understanding. When the person writing about him- or herself 
has moved out of the self, thus incorporating an external gaze, 
a strange kind of objectivity arises, something which at one 
and the same time belongs to the inner and the outer, and 
this objectivity makes it possible to move around in one’s own 
self as if it belonged to another, and then we have come full 
circle, for the movement requires empathy. (Summer, p. 127)
To be able to write the way as he did, Knausgaard felt that he 
needed to be free (VI, p. 1009). It was important to be free 
“from people looking at you” (The Guardian, 1 March 2015). 
The negative attention that we may receive from others is the 
prime trigger of shame, and so parrhe¯sia in the Knausgaardian 
manner requires above all that one gets rid of shame. Knausgaard 
had to make himself indifferent to how others may perceive him 
and think of him as a result of what he writes. A great number of 
scholars who have contributed to the sociology of emotions – such 
as the aforementioned Simmel and Cooley as well as Norbert Elias 
and Erving Goffman, for example – have addressed how shame 
operates as a crucial mechanism in social life. Knausgaard suggests 
the same in the sixth and final volume of My Struggle. As people 
want to avoid both feeling ashamed and shaming others, they 
behave in a manner that is appropriate and expected of them. 
However, the fear of shame also prevents people from saying 
the truth, and thus it stands in conflict with parrhe¯sia. Shame 
regulates the degrees by which we, in social relationships with 
others, may say what we really think, making us hide the truth 
or at least parts of it.
Shame is intimately connected to secrecy. The secret plays 
a highly significant role in and for social relationships. Simmel, 
for example, maintains that establishing social relationships 
necessitates that one knows something of the other, but this 
knowledge is also necessarily limited and thwarted (Simmel, 1950, 
pp. 309–10). Its limitations and distortions are partly due to to 
the fact that there is something psychologically unattainable in 
the other (Simmel, [1923] 2004b, p. 188; 1971, p. 246), but they 
also have to do with discretion: out of consideration for others, 
we refrain from telling it all. One must respect the other’s privacy. 
We know more about others than they voluntarily reveal about 
themselves, but for the sake of tact it is not polite to tell it all 
(Simmel, [1906] 1993). In volume 6, The End, Knausgaard, too, 
emphasizes how secrecy regulates our social relationships: “The 
social dimension is based on taking one another into consideration. 
We also do this by hiding our feelings, not saying what we think, if 
what we feel or think affects others” (VI, p. 1009). He also reflects 
on this a few hundred pages earlier, when he suggests that “the 
social world is a game that proceeds according to certain rules, 
some things are hidden, some are shown, and that in a way we live 
an illusion” (VI, p. 360). Therefore, “the genuine is the opposite 
of the social”, Knausgaard proposes (VI, p. 363). The relation of 
secrecy and openness implied here relates in a fascinating manner 
to Simmel. Relationships, Simmel stresses, “presuppose a certain 
ignorance and a measure of mutual concealment” (Simmel, 1950, 
p. 315). In this sense, the secret, the hiding of realities, may have 
positive effects for the maintenance of social relationships. It 
“offers”, as Simmel puts it, “the possibility of a second world 
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alongside the manifest world; and the latter is decisively influenced 
by the former” (Simmel, 1950, p. 330).
Given that sociality is subjected to secrecy, the parrhesiast 
writing that My Struggle evinces is only possible by transgressing 
sociality. In The End, Knausgaard remarks on the individual 
volumes of the cycles:
[I]n their every sentence [I] have tried to transcend the social 
world by conveying the innermost thoughts and innermorst 
feelings of my most private self, my own internal life, but 
also by describing the private sphere of my family as it exists 
behind the façade all families set up against the social world, 
doing so in a public form, a novel. (VI, p. 826)
In his prose, Knausgaard describes “what no one wants to be 
described, in other words, the secret and the hidden” (VI, p. 
1009). In a sense, My Struggle presents an anti-Goffmanian 
experiment, driven by uncompromised disregard for impression 
management and respect for the personal integrity of others. For 
Knausgaard, literature in general and My Struggle in particular is 
an attempt to contravene social norms (VI, p. 1009). Literature 
should provide an escape from sociality and how it is based on the 
hiding of reality: “But isn’t literature precisely a sanctuary where 
the rules of the social game don’t apply? Isn’t literature the only 
place where it is possible to be absolutely truthful, since writing 
is one of the few social acts which take place beyond the social 
realm?” (Summer: 126; italics added) Complete honesty is not 
possible within the plays of sociality, as those plays are structured 
according to secrecy. It is perhaps possible only in literature.
To tell the truth, Knausgaard felt he needed to be inconsiderate 
to others and not think about the consequences of his writing. To 
write like that necessitates turning away from the world, stepping 
outside society – to some extent even outside of humanity, as 
Knausgaard himself suggests in an interview (The Guardian, 1 
March 2015). To contravene social norms means taking a step that 
may lead us into the inhuman, because “[t]o be human is to be 
several. To be social. The social world is a community” (VI, p. 358). 
In this sense, despite their obvious differences, there is a disturbing 
similarity between Knausgaard’s act of writing, exposing those 
close to him in a merciless and direct manner, and for example 
the terrorist act perpetrated by Breivik on Utoya island. That is 
also the reason why Knausgaard shortly writes about Breivik in 
the sixth volume, as “he formed a coherent part of the thesis of 
My Struggle” (The Guardian, 1 March 2015). Parrhesiast writing 
becomes an immoral act, even an art of cruelty. “Ruthlessness” is 
its “very core and justification” (Summer, p. 126). As Knausgaard 
proposes in The End, volume 6 of My Struggle: “To write these 
things you have to be free, and to be free you have to be 
inconsiderate to others. […] Truth equals freedom equals being 
inconsiderate” (VI, p. 1009). For Knausgaard, all the ruthlessness 
that writing may display is thus justified and even demanded 
by truth-telling. Truth needs to be told for example about his 
authoritative, tyrannical father who ultimately drank himself to 
death. Knausgaard does not spare words on anyone near him. 
The directness with which he writes about real situations, people, 
and his relationship to them can be felt as rude and disrespectful. 
But it is toward himself that he is the most ruthless. He does not 
present himself in a light favourable to him. Quite the contrary, he 
exposes all his faults and weaknesses: his insequrities, selfishness, 
patheticness, and cowardness; the reckless drunken whims; how 
he cheated on his first wife; as well as how he rants and raves 
at his children and occasionally grabs them physically when he 
loses his temper. 
However, despite all his strivings to be free and tell the truth 
without conealing anything, ultimately Knausgaard is forced 
to admit to himself that he has not been able to say it all. The 
paradox of parrhesiast writing is that while requiring a disregard for 
others, it is still dependent on others; without the you, whom one 
addresses, there is no language and no speaking or writing subject. 
It is to the you that the I addresses itself, writes to, and pronounces 
itself as a writing subject. The freedom experiment of My Struggle 
is thereby bound to fail: “I have never even been close to saying 
what I really mean and describe what I have actually seen” (VI, p. 
1010). Knausgaard hesitates, pulls back, stylizes things, starts to 
censor himself, is conscious of how others may perceive the text 
and how it may affect them, and thus cannot but become cautious. 
Nevertheless, the failure does not diminish the significance of the 
effort. On the contrary, it is perhaps precisely in how it fails where 
the greatest value of the experiment lies, as it renders visible the 
inescapability of sociality and how such mechanisms as shame and 
secrecy regulate our actions. My Struggle cannot but step outside 
the confines of literature and enter the social. In the sixth and final 
volume of his work, Knausgaard suggests of Mein Kampf, after 
which he has ironically and provocatively named his novel, that as 
a symbol of human evil it is much more more than just literature: 
Hitler’s book is no longer literature. What later happened, 
what he later did, the axioms of which are meticulously laid 
out in that book, is such that it transforms the literature into 
something evil […] Mein Kampf is more than text. In it the 
door between the text and reality is wide open, in a way quite 
unlike any other book. (VI, p. 483)
Knausgaard’s efforts to the contrary notwithstanding, the door 
between the text and reality remains open in My Struggle, too, 
and it is here where the similarity between Hitler’s auto-biography 
and Knausgaard’s autofiction novel lies. Knausgaard’s writing is 
inevitably embedded in the meshwork of social relationships. No 
matter how hard he tries to write free from social norms and 
expectations, without considering the consequences of what he 
writes, his writing nevertheless does affect his close ones, and this 
cannot but affect his writing. 
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Parrhesiast writing is inevitably out of the bounds of literature. 
Therefore, by trying to break literary taboos and social norms 
it not only uncovers them, but also participates in testifying to 
their power.
Conclusion
In the article, I have examined Karl Ove Knausgaard’s writing in 
and of his six-volume autofiction cycle My Struggle as a practice 
of telling the truth about self. In its permeated introspection, 
the writing is concerned with the enigma of the self and with 
the question of how the self can be grasped. It tries to get to 
the bottom of the relationships, situations, motifs, thoughts, and 
memories that shape and constitute the main character and real 
person Karl Ove Knausgaard. It is because of this that the novel 
is also to a great extent preoccupied with the question of memory 
and how memory forms a significant part of our identity or self: 
reminiscence evokes an entire region of one’s past and a world 
of experiences, perceptions, feelings, and thoughts.
Nevertheless, My Struggle should not be read as a sheer 
representation of reality. The main character is not a perfect copy 
or simulation of the living and breathing Karl Ove Knausgaard, 
but more or less a literary invention and an “experimental ego”,8 
black marks on a white page. The book is not a treatise evincing 
a theoretical interest in the self, but a novel exploring the enigma 
of the self through the logic and techniques of literature. What is 
more, while My Struggle incorporates details from the life of its 
author, it is also conspicuously a book on writing. It poses writing 
as a problem, in terms of truth. Knausgaard sets out to write 
about his life as truthfully as possible, without concealment. 
The novel is a freedom experiment, exploring the possibility of 
writing and literature. For Knausgaard, writing is possible only 
when it is ruthless and free from shame and its workings in social 
life. Writing, therefore, appears as a practice that is inherently 
social and yet necessitates the transgression of the social. 
However, ultimately, as I argued above, the freedom experiment 
fails and thus comes to testify to the power of sociality and its 
norms. To tell the truth just might be the most difficult thing 
there is. Lying is much easier and in many cases also socially 
more acceptable than truth-telling, as sociality demands secrecy 
and is premised on it for the sake of consideration, politeness, 
and fear of shame. From our early childhood we are brought 
up in a culture of secrecy, and there exist social institutions 
maintaining and requiring the practice of lying, inscribed in 
politics and advertising, for example. When one tells the truth 
one crosses a line and risks not only one’s relationship to others, 
but also one’s own position.
 8.  Cf. Asher and Kundera (1987, p. 127).
Not surprisingly, then, Knausgaard’s noble literary aims 
regarding unrestrained truthfulness easily become subject to 
dispute. At least two critical points suggest themselves. The first 
has to do with the morality of writing. The parrhesiast act of telling 
the truth may come out as immoral, since by exceeding social 
norms and rules it violates morality, which is a notion of the social 
world, the we ruling the I, and stands above the truth (see also 
VI, p. 826). By what right does the author expose the lives and 
secrets of those close to him? Is not the violation of the other’s 
privacy that his writing carries out a continuation of the age-old 
form of aggressivity that nowadays is both institutionalized (let 
us only think of bureaucracy with its documents, or the media 
and the exposure it seeks) and justified morally (with the right 
to know having become of primary significance among the 
rights of subjects) (Kundera, 1988, p. 152)? Does it attest to 
the turning of the political axis of individuation in the dispositive 
of modern disciplinary power: instead of those using power, 
it is those subjected to it who are individuated, exposed, and 
transparent, while power itself becomes anonymous, secret, and 
coded (Foucault, [1975] 1991)?
Second, besides violating the privacy of others, is My Struggle 
also a continuation of the machinery of confession? With the 
notion of confession, Foucault referred to the procedures by 
which the subject is incited to produce a discourse of truth of 
him- or hereself, which is capable of having effects on the subject 
him- or herself (Foucault, 1980, pp. 215–6). In the machinery 
of confession, psychoanalysis and Freud figure as episodes, but 
so do the confessional and the Christian method of direction of 
conscience. To some extent, My Struggle is part of the same 
lineage. What is more, with Knausgaard, truth is not even forced 
out of him, but he tells it most willingly, out of his free choice. 
In a sense, then, My Struggle fits perfectly the age where self-
exposure has become an obligation and a norm. Social media is 
an obvious example. In 2013, Facebook reported that its users 
had uploaded 250 billion photos, and were uploading 250 million 
new photos each day. However, Knausgaard’s literary motives 
are not simply confessional. While the novel seems to manifest 
radical self-exposure, Knausgaard does not seek (self-)exposure 
for the sake of (self-)exposure, that is, write just to become 
acknowleged and noticed. He writes to see rather than to be 
seen. His writing is driven by the will to truth, to understand the 
self and its relation to culture, its being-in-the-world. Like modern 
art, it makes the conditions of representation its object, asking 
under what conditions could writing be free and tell the truth. 
Besides being an utterly personal endeavour, My Struggle is also 
a literary experiment, which maps the interaction between art 
and life, literature and the social, and puts the boundary between 
them to the test, trying out to what extent it is possible for writing 
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to break away from the social world and its rules and forces. It 
relentlessly explores the scope and potential of literary freedom, 
making an effort to expand what the novel is and what it may be 
capable of, and what possibilities open up for oneself as a writer.
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